When Does F*** Not Mean F***?: FCC v. Fox Television Stations and a Call for Protecting Emotive Speech by Hopkins, W. Wat
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 64 | Issue 1 Article 2
12-2011
When Does F*** Not Mean F***?: FCC v. Fox
Television Stations and a Call for Protecting
Emotive Speech
W. Wat Hopkins
Virginia Tech
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, Constitutional Law
Commons, First Amendment Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hopkins, W. Wat (2011) "When Does F*** Not Mean F***?: FCC v. Fox Television Stations and a Call for Protecting Emotive
Speech," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 64: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol64/iss1/2
When Does F*** Not Mean F***?:
FCC v. Fox Television Stations and a
Call for Protecting Emotive Speech
W. Wat Hopkins*
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 1
II. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION V. Fox TELEVISION
STATIONS, INC........................................ 7
III. ANTECEDENTS TO Fox TELEVISION STATIONS . .............. 15
A. Cohen and Emotive Speech..............16
B. Pacifica and "Words You Never Say ............... 21
IV. CHAPLINSKY, COHEN AND BEYOND ........................ 23
V. WHEN DOES F*** NOT MEAN F***? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
VI. THE F-WORD--THE NEXT ROUND ...................... 37
VII. AN EMOTIVE SPEECH DOCTRINE? . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . . . .. 39
VIII. BROADCAST MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT................42
IX. CONCLUSION ................................ ...... 45
1. INTRODUCTION
Almost since the beginning of its First Amendment jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court of the United States has had a love-hate relationship with
words. Some words, the Court said early in its free-speech history, are
undeserving of First Amendment protection because, in balance, they harm
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society or do not contribute to the search for truth.' The very utterance of
such words would "inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace."2 Other words deserve extra protection because they are "the
essence of self-government." 3 These words constitute "speech that
matters.'A For the most part, the Court has been able to delineate a structure
to this "hierarchy of First Amendment values,"5 but whether the application
of the First Amendment to that structure has been effective is another
question. One critic noted, for example, that the Court's use of the theory
that "not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance"6 "has been
marked by vacillation and uncertainty." 7 Clearly, the Court's dealings with
nontraditional language and conduct can be so categorized. Whether the
issue is the discussion of words that cannot be uttered over the airwaves,
nude dancers in Pennsylvania,9 or award-winning musicians uttering
profanities on television,' 0 the Court has seemingly become befuddled
when confronted with expression that is indecent or simply out of the
ordinary."l
The Court's confrontation with such slippery topics continued in the
2008-2009 term with FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,12 a case
involvip one of the Court's biggest bugaboos-the use of the so-called "f-
word." The case did not turn on the use of the offensive word, however,
1. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
2. Id.
3. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 271, 273 (1964) (The "central meaning of the First Amendment" is to protect
speech of self-governing importance.). See also id. at 282 ("It is as much [the citizen's] duty
to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer.").
4. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
5. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (plurality).
6. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985).
7. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low- Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REv. 297, 298
(1995).
8. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726.
9. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
10. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
11. Another example that does not fit easily into a specific category but demonstrates
the Court's troubles dealing with the language is Morse v. Frederick. There, the Court
allowed the punishment of a student for displaying a banner that read "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" at an off-campus, school-sponsored function. 551 U.S. 393, 393 (2007). Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts found that the banner either advocated or celebrated
the use of marijuana. Id. at 402. Not all Justices agreed. Justice John Paul Stevens called the
banner's message nonsense that neither advocated action nor violated any school policy. Id.
at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
13. The Author struggled with how to use the offending language in this Article, and
ultimately decided to use the toned-down descriptor except in direct quotations or where the
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but on the more mundane question of whether the FCC met the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")14 when it
changed its policies relating to the broadcast of indecent language. While
federal law prohibits the use of obscene, profane, or indecent language over
the airwaves,1 5 the FCC, with the blessings of the Court,16 established that
fleeting expletives did not meet the definition of indecency, whereas
repetitive use of such words did.'7 When, in 2004, the FCC changed its
policy and later took actions against broadcasters for on-air fleeting
expletives,18 it was required by the APA to ensure that such changes and
resulting rulemaking were not arbitrary and capricious.19
Whether the FCC met that requirement was the question in Fox
Television Stations. It is clear, however, that language was the undercurrent
of the opinion. Only Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer2l did
not specifically address the use of the f-word. Each of the other Justices at
least confronted it, and the use of the word was key to the majority opinion
22 2by Justice Antonin Scalia and the dissent of Justice John Paul Stevens.23
Justices Scalia and Stevens were clearly at odds over both the use and
definitions of the word, elements that might play a significant role in the
use of the full word contributes to a greater understanding of the issue or issues being
discussed.
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2006).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).
16. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732, 750 (1978);. See also Robert Corn-
Revere, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.: Awaiting the Next Act, 2009 CATO SUP. CT.
REv. 295, 307-08 (2009).
17. Application of WGBH Educ. Found., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 69 F.C.C.
2d 1250, para. 10 (1978) [hereinafter WGBHEduc. Found.].
18. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, paras. 4, 12
(2004) [hereinafter Golden Globes Order].
19. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
20. Justice Thomas's concurrence was based on his assertion that there was
"questionable viability" in Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), and FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), as precedents. 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819-20 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Dramatic changes in technology that eviscerated the assumptions underlying
the opinions, Justice Thomas wrote, would support a departure from the precedents
established in the cases. Id. at 1821-22 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 748-49; Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1806,
1820-22, 1822 n.5; infra text accompanying notes 351-358.
21. Though Justice Breyer did not specifically confront the use of the f-word on the
airwaves, he wrote that the majority had misinterpreted Pacifica and wrote in support of the
fleeting expletives protocol. 129 S. Ct. at 1833-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1808-09, 1812.
23. Id. at 1826-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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constitutional questions that were avoided in Fox Television Stations24 but
25
are now at issue.
A panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in July 2010 that
the FCC's indecency policy was unconstitutionally vague because it
created "a chilling effect that goes far beyond the fleeting expletives at
issue here."26 In a bruising attack on the policy, the Second Circuit reported
that broadcasters "simply want to know with some degree of certainty what
the policy is so that they can comply with it."27 The broadcasters do not
know, however, because the FCC does not know. After summarizing the
FCC's application of what it called "a vague, indiscernible standard," the
court noted that "[i]f the FCC cannot anticipate what will be considered
indecent under its policy, then it can hardly expect broadcasters to do so."28
The court suggested that strict scrutiny should apply to regulations on
broadcast television, in part because the changes in the media landscape
over the years have eliminated "the twin pillars of pervasiveness and
accessibility to children" as rationales for lessened protection for the
broadcast media.29 But, the court noted, it could not establish that standard
because it was "bound by Supreme Court precedent, regardless of whether
it reflects today's realities.'," The FCC may be able to create a
constitutional indecency policy, the court indicated, but the current policy
fails constitutional scrutiny. In June 2011, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 32
Similar issues are integral to two other cases that will be implicated
by a ruling in Fox Television Stations. Earlier this year, the Second Circuit
vacated a fine of $1.21 million against ABC affiliate stations imposed by
the FCC.33 ABC, Inc. v. FCC involved a fleeting image rather than a
fleeting expletive. The FCC had fined ABC $27,500 for each station that
broadcasted an episode of NYPD Blue in which a woman's bare buttocks
24. Id. at 1819. The Second Circuit also avoided the issue. See Fox Television Stations
v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
25. Justice Scalia suggested that those issues might return to the Court. "It is
conceivable that the Commission's orders may cause some broadcasters to avoid certain
language that is beyond the Commission's reach under the Constitution," he wrote. 129 S.
Ct. at 1819. "Whether that is so, and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional, will be determined
soon enough, perhaps in this very case." Id.
26. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010).
27. Id. at 331.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 326.
30. Id. at 327.
31. Id. at 335.
32. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011) (mem.).
33. See ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 404 F. App'x 530, 533-34 (2d Cir. 2011).
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were shown for approximately seven seconds.34 "[T]here is no significant
distinction between this case and Fox," the court held,35 and because the
indecency policy was held unconstitutionally vague in that case, the FCC
order, based on the same policy, was vacated.36
A third case, CBS Corporation v. FCC,37 is stalled in the Third
Circuit. The network is challenging an FCC-imposed fine of $550,000
against CBS-owned television stations for the broadcast of the 2004 Super
Bowl Halftime Show.38 During the performance, entertainer Justin
Timberlake pulled a portion of the costume worn by Janet Jackson,
exposing Jackson's breast for nine-sixteenths of one second.39 The FCC
maintained that, even if its fleeting expletive protocol was in place, that
protocol applied only to fleeting utterances and not to visual images. 40In
its 2008 ruling in the case, the Third Circuit rejected the FCC's argument.
Even though the exposure of Jackson's breast was "a deceitful and
manipulative act,"'a the FCC's policy on fleeting material was in effect
when the exposure occurred,42 and a review of the FCC's enforcement
history demonstrated that the FCC had never limited its fleeting expletive
protocol only to utterances. 43 When the FCC took action against CBS, it
did so despite "a consistent and entrenched policy of excludin fleeting
broadcast material from the scope of actionable indecency,' and the
action against CBS was a departure from prior policz.4 The action,
therefore, was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Six days after
deciding Fox Television Stations, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment
in the CBS case and remanded it for consideration in light of its decision.47
On November 2, however, the Third Circuit again ruled that the action by
the FCC was arbitrary and capricious under the APA, primarily because the
34. Id. at 533-34.
35. Id. at 535.
36. Id. at 533.
37. 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009) (remanded for
further consideration in light of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800
(2009)).
38. Id. at 171-72.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 174.
41. Id. at 171.
42. Id. at 174.
43. Id. at 174-75.
44. Id. at 179.
45. Id. at 181.
46. Id. at 189.
47. FCC v. CBS Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009) (mem. op.).
5
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action occurred prior to the FCC rulings that became the basis for the Fox
Television Stations.48
But more than the outcomes of the ABC and CBS cases hinges on the
Court's decision in Fox Television Stations. The entire structure of the
FCC's policymaking on indecency and, indeed, the philosophy behind the
regulation of broadcasting may be at issue. Attorney Robert Corn-Revere,
for example, predicted that the Fox decision was "more like an intermission
between acts" than "the end of the story."49 He wrote that a "more
momentous judicial review of the FCC's ban on broadcast indecency is yet
to come."50
When the Court considers Fox Television Stations, it could parse
definitions of words or delve into the changing role of the broadcast media
in an increasingly technological world. A simpler solution, however, may
lie in a case that only Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg cited in Fox Television
Stations. Cohen v. California is the only case in the Court's history that
turned exclusively on the Court's examination of the f-word.5 It is
remarkable that Justice Scalia ignored the case, though he may have done
so because it was not related to broadcasting. Justice Ginsburg recognized
the relevance of Cohen, however. She quoted language that could well hold
the key to the resolution of the indecency issue, particularly in light of
Justice Thomas's biting critique in Fox Television Stations of the
regulatory scheme governing the broadcast media-rules that he says were
poorly conceived and are irrelevant in today's media environment.5 3
In Cohen, Justice John Marshall Harlan recognized that language has
two elements-cognitive and emotive-and wrote that the emotive element
deserves as much protection as the cognitive.54 Unfortunately, no other
justice or Court has fully recognized the import of Justice Harlan's
proposal, and it has withered since its enunciation in 1971. Its revival could
very well provide a solution to the issues dividing Justices Scalia and
Stevens and establish a reasonable framework for confronting indecent
speech.
48. CBS v. FCC,_ F.3d (3d. Cir. 2011),2011 WL 5176139.
49. Corn-Revere, supra note 16, at 297 (noting that the parties "extensively briefed and
argued whether the new policy violates the First Amendment," though the Court avoided
that issue).
50. Id.
51. 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see infra note 129.
52. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1829 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1821-22 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also infra discussion accompanying
notes 351-358.
54. 403 U.S. at 25-26. See also text accompanying infra notes 158-60.
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1I. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. Fox TELEVISION
STATIONS, INC.
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
grew from the broadcasts of the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards on
the Fox Television network, though the FCC's response to the broadcasts
did not occur until 2006. The FCC had, in fact, altered its policy on
broadcast indecency in 2004, based on a broadcast that occurred in 2003. 5
58The FCC did not impose sanctions for the 2003 broadcast, however, so a
challenge to the policy change did not occur until the complaint by Fox.
That serpentine intermingling of broadcasts and actions provides some idea
of the convoluted nature of FCC policymaking and enforcement.
The 2004 policy change grew from the 2003 broadcast of the Golden
Globes Awards, during which entertainer Bono commented that his
receiving an award was "really, really fucking brilliant."5 9 The FCC's
enforcement bureau concluded that the comment was not indecent because
Bono "did not describe, in context, sexual or excretory organs or activities
and that the utterance was fleeting and isolated."60 The full FCC reversed,
finding that the use of the word fell within its indecency definition, even
though it was used as an intensifier rather than a literal descriptor, holding:
"[G]iven the core meaning of the 'F-Word,' any use of that word . . .
inherently has a sexual connotation . . . ." The broadcast was determined
to be patently offensive because the word "is one of the most vulgar,
graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English
language," and "[ilts use invariably invokes a coarse sexual image." In
addition, Bono's use was found to be entirely shocking and gratuitous.6 3
The FCC also found that exempting such language from enforcement
actions because of its fleeting use would lead to more widespread use of the
language, and the action was necessary to safeguard children.6 4 In addition,
55. 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1808 (2008).
56. Complaints Regarding Various Television Brdcsts. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8,
2005, Notices of Apparent Liab. and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2644
(Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter BillboardLiab. Notice].
57. Id.
58. Golden Globes Order, supra note 18, at para. 15 (March 18, 2004).
59. Id. at para. 3 n.4.
60. Id. at para. 3, at 4976.
61. Id. at para. 8.
62. Id. at para. 9.
63. Id.
64. Id.
7
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the FCC found that technological advances have made it easier to excise a
single use of an expletive.65
The FCC acknowledged that it was changing course in its regulation
of indecent language. Previously, the FCC noted, such a broadcast would
have been permitted under FCC precedent, so in the case at issue, the
broadcaster "did not have the requisite notice to justify a penalty."66
However, the FCC held, the exemption of fleeting expletives from FCC
action "is no longer good law."67
The change in policy, despite Justice Scalia's attempt in the opinion
of the Court to develop a contrary position, was relatively sudden. The
FCC first invoked the statutory ban on indecent broadcasts in 1975 and
announced the definition of indecent speech that, as Justice Scalia pointed
out, "it uses to this day": 68 "[L]anguage that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs, at times of the
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." 69
The Supreme Court embraced that reformulation of the indecency
concept in its 1978 ruling in Federal Communications Commission v.
Pacifica Foundation, upholding sanctions for a mid-afternoon broadcast of
a monologue by George Carlin describing words that could not be uttered
over the airwaves. 70 The Court emphasized that its ruling was narrow, that
is, that the monologue was indecent as broadcast and that it would not be
indecent in other circumstances.71 The time of the broadcast was a key
factor, but so was the fact that the offensive words were repeated many
times.7 2
The Court and the FCC seemed to be of one accord on the issue of
broadcast indecency. Three years after its holding in Pacifica, the FCC
reiterated its intent to observe the narrow nature of the holding, which
relied in part on the repetition of the offensive words. 73 Nine years later,
the FCC called that protocol "unduly narrow," but declared that each literal
description of sexual or excretory function would be considered in the
65. Id. at para. 11.
66. Id. at para. 15, at 4982.
67. Id. at para. 12.
68. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1806 (2008).
69. A Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 11 (1975).
70. 438 U.S. 726, 741 (1978).
71. Id. at 746, 750.
72. Id. at 739, 750.
73. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1806 (quoting Application of WGBH Educ.
Found., supra note 17, at para. 10).
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context of the use, even if the use was not repetitive. 74 The FCC reported,
however, that repetition would continue to be a requisite to a findin of
indecency when a complaint focuses on the use of non-literal expletives. 5
In 2001, the FCC again emphasized the "full context" element of its
analysis holding that no single factor would provide the basis for a
ruling. Three years later, in the case involving Bono, declared for the first
time that a non-literal use of an expletive could be actionably indecent,
even when the word was used only once. 77 In the absence of sanctions
against NBC for the Golden Globes broadcast, however, the case ended.
The FCC's change in protocol was not challenged until Fox Television
Stations did so in 2006 in a case that actually began four years earlier.
At the 2002 Billboard Music Awards show, Cher aimed an expletive
at her critics: "I've also had critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on
the way out every year. Right. So f*** 'em." 78 And at the same awards
show a year later, Nicole Richie used both the s-word and the f-word
during her presentation, despite a mock warning from co-presenter Paris
Hilton.79 March 15, 2006, the FCC released Notices of Apparent Liability
for a number of broadcasts, including the two Billboard Music Awards
shows, but imposed no sanctions.so
The FCC found both broadcasts patently offensive under community
standards for television because they involved entirely gratuitous uses of
"one of the most vulgar, graphic, and explicit words for sexual activity in
the English language."a The broadcasts involved literal descriptions rather
than intensifiers, the FCC held, and it found its prior "strict dichotomy
between 'expletives' and 'descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory
functions"' to be artificial and illogical "in light of the fact that an
'expletive's' power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory
meaning."82
74. Id. at 1807.
75. Id. (quoting Pacifica Foundation, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2
F.C.C.R. 2698, paras. 12-13, (April 29, 1987)).
76. Id (citation omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1808.
79. Id.
80. See Billboard Liab. Notice. Other shows at issue were various episodes of NYPD
Blue, complaints of which were dismissed on procedural grounds, and CBS's The Early
Show, which were held not to be indecent or profane. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 323-24 (2d Cir. 2010).
81. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1809 (quoting Complaints Regarding
Various TV Brdcsts. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8, 2005, Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299,
paras. 17, 59 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Remand Order]).
82. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1809 (quoting 2006 Remand Order,
9Number 1]
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Remarkably, the Order also stated that the immunity for isolated
indecent expletives rested only upon staff rulings and dicta, and that the
FCC had never held that the isolated use of an expletive was exempt from a
finding of indecency.83 Therefore, Justice Scalia would later add, the order
made clear that the FCC had "eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives
could be actionably indecent. . . ."84
The FCC imposed no sanctions, but a number of parties petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for judicial review.
Because of the absence of sanctions, the FCC had not given the
broadcasters an opportunity, to respond to the indecency charges, so it
requested and obtained from the Second Circuit a voluntary remand so the
parties could voice their objections.85
The Second Circuit found the FCC's reasoning for its change
inadequate under the APA, but Justice Scalia had no trouble upholding
the policy change.87 Under the Act, he wrote, an agency must show that
there are good reasons for a new policy but is not required to demonstrate
that the reasons for the new policy are better than those for the old policy.88
The FCC explained the rationale for the change, he wrote, and the reasons
satisfied the statutory requirement.89 In addition, Justice Scalia found the
FCC's reasoning entirely rational:
It was certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense to
distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words,
requiring repetitive use to render only the latter indecent. As the
Commission said with regard to expletive use of the F-Word, "9t e
word's power to insult and offend derives from its sexual meaning."
supra note 81, at para. 23).
83. 2006 Remand Order, supra note 81, at para. 21.
84. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1809.
85. 2006 Remand Order, supra note 81, at para. 9.
86. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 2007).
87. For arguments for and against the change, see Toby Coleman, Comment,
Explaining Change and Rethinking Dirty Words: FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 4
DuKE J. CONST. L. & PuB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 71 (2008), https://www.law.duke.edu/
joumals/djclpp/index.php ?action=showitem&id=88 (suggesting that the FCC rule may be
unconstitutional); Justin Winquist, Note, Arbitrary and F^@#$*! Capricious: An Analysis of
the Second Circuit's Rejection of the FCC's Fleeting Expletive Regulation in Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 57 Am. U. L. REv. 723 (2008) (favoring the FCC rule); Constitutional
Law - Vagueness - Second Circuit Strikes Down the FCC's Indecency Policy as Void for
Vagueness - Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010), 124 HARV.
L. REv. 835 (2011) (finding fault with the Second Circuit's reasoning on remand).
88. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1812.
89. See id. at 1813.
90. Id. at 1812 (quoting 2006 Remand Order, supra note 81, at para. 58).
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 10 2011-2012
Number 1] PROTECTING EMOTIVE SPEECH
Justice Scalia conceded that the change may cause some broadcasters to
avoid certain language that is beyond the governing power of the FCC but
left the determination of constitutional questions for another day.91
The issue before the Court technically might have been one of
administrative law, but it is clear that Justice Scalia's opinion was colored
in large part by the particular words involved, and he made no effort to hide
his enthusiasm in endorsing the FCC's new policy. Twice he pointed out
that the FCC had made it extremely clear that fleeting expletives were not
subject to action;92 twice he quoted language to the effect that the f-word
inherently has a sexual connotation, even when used in nonliteral
contexts,93 and it is from that connotation that the word derives its power to
offend; 94 twice he quoted language calling the f-word "one of the most
vulgar, gra hic, and explicit words for sexual activity in the English
language";9 and twice he reported that Cher's statement during the 2002
Billboard Music Awards was patently offensive because the entertainer did
not use the word "as a mere intensifier," but "metaphorically suggested a
sexual act as a means of expressing hostility to her critics,' ignoring a
contradictory assessment of the comment by Justice Stevens.97 All this to
buttress the FCC's argument that its policy change was reasonable.
Justice Stevens' dissent demonstrated that he was greatly troubled by
the holding, and, in particular, its reliance upon Federal Communications
Commission v. Pacifica Foundation as support.98
91. Id. at 1819. See also supra note 25.
92. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1808 ("[Any such interpretation [that
fleeting expletives are exempt] is no longer good law." (quoting Golden Globes Order,
supra note 18, at para. 12)); id. at 1809 ("[T]he Golden Globes Order eliminated any doubt
that fleeting expletives" were subject to sanction. (citing 2006 Remand Order, supra note
81, at paras. 23, 61)).
93. Id. at 1808-09 (2009) (quoting Golden Globes Order, supra note 18, at paras. 8-9;
2006 Remand Order, supra note 81, at paras. 16, 58).
94. Id. at 1808.
95. Id. (quoting Golden Globes Order, supra note 18, para. 9; 2006 Remand Order,
supra note 81, at paras. 17, 59). The quotes, though on different pages and in different
sections of the opinion, were five paragraphs apart.
96. Id. at 1809 (citing 2006 Remand Order supra note 81, at para. 60). The two
quotations were in subsequent paragraphs.
97. See id. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, in Part III-E of his opinion, titled
"The Dissents' Arguments," Justice Scalia does not address the arguments about the use of
the language made by Justice Stevens. Id. at 1816-17.
98. While Justice Stevens dedicated much of his dissent to the improper definition of
"indecency" by the FCC and the Court, he also joined Justice Breyer's dissent on grounds
that the FCC did not adequately explain its rationale in changing policy with regard to the
regulation of indecent language. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1825-26
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
11
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The facts of Pacifica are so well-known that only a brief
recapitulation is needed here.99 The case was instigated by a complaint
from a man who, while driving with his son, turned on his radio and was
confronted by a pro am being broadcasted on a New York radio station
owned by Pacifica. As part of a program on society's attitude toward
language, the station broadcast a monologue by comedian George Carlin
titled "Filthy Words."' 0' In the monologue, Carlin repeated seven words
that "you couldn't say on the public . . . airwaves . . . the ones you
definitely wouldn't say, ever."1 The words were shit, piss, fuck, cunt,
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. 103
The Court did not consider the specific definition of the f-word in
Pacifica, but a key question was whether prurience was an element of
indecency. The Pacifica Foundation argued that the broadcast was not
indecent because it lacked prurient appeal.104 The Court held that the
statute at issue prohibited words that were "obscene, indecent, or profane"
and found that each of those descriptors had a separate meaning.los
"Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene," Justice Stevens wrote for
the Court, "but the normal definition of 'indecent' merely refers to
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality."1 06 Prurient appeal,
therefore, was not "an essential component of indecent language."' The
distinction might be significant in some cases but was irrelevant in Fox
Television Stations, because the majority followed the lead of Justice Scalia
in his assertion that the f-word is always sexual and therefore always
indecent.
In his Fox Television Stations dissent, Justice Stevens emphasized
that the Court found the monologue by George Carlin indecent as
broadcast. "We did not decide whether an isolated expletive could qualify
as indecent," he wrote, "[aind we certainly did not hold that any word with
a sexual or scatological origin, however used, was indecent." 0 8 The
repetition issue has garnered the most attention, he wrote, but Pacifica
99. See infra notes 170-78.
100. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 726 (1978).
101. Id. at 729-30.
102. Id. at 729.
103. Id. at 751 app. A verbatim transcript of the monologue, prepared by the FCC, was
attached as an appendix to the Opinion of the Court. See id. at 751-55 app.
104. Id. at 739.
105. Id. at 739-40.
106. Id. at 740 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)).
107. Id. at 741.
108. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1827 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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permitted the FCC to regulate only those words that describe sex or
excrement. The FCC minimized that limitation by claiming that "any use of
the words at issue in this case, in any context and in any form, necessarily
describes sex or excrement," a claim that is refuted by "[t]he customs of
speech."109 Justice Stevens wrote: "There is a critical distinction between
the use of an expletive to describe a sexual or excretory function and the
use of such a word for an entirely different purpose, such as to express an
emotion. One rests at the core of indecency; the other stands miles
apart."" 0
Justice Stevens also found it ironic that "while the FCC patrols the
airwaves for words that have a tenuous relationship with sex or excrement,
commercials broadcast during prime-time hours frequently ask viewers
whether they too are battling erectile dysfunction or are having trouble
going to the bathroom."' 
11
It would be absurd, Justice Stevens wrote, to find an expletive uttered
by a frustrated golfer to be sexual: "But that is the absurdity the FCC has
embraced in its new approach to indecency."ll2 By improperly equating
words that are impolite in their usage with words that are indecent, the FCC
has adopted an "interpretation of 'indecency' that bears no resemblance to
what Pacifica contemplated. Most distressingly, the Commission appears
to be entirely unaware of this fact . . . and today's majority seems
untroubled by this significant oversight." 1 3
Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Stevens. Unlike the Carlin
monologue, she wrote, "the unscripted fleeting expletives at issue here are
neither deliberate nor relentlessly repetitive." 14 "Spontaneous utterances,"
she wrote, quoting Justice Harlan's cogent admonishment in Cohen that
words have both cognitive and emotive meaninMs, are used "simply to
convey an emotion or intensify a statement. She also quoted an
assertion by Justice Anthony Kennedy that a word categorized as indecent
"often is inseparable from the ideas and viewpoints conveyed, or separable
only with loss of truth or expressive power,"1 6 and a warning from Justice
William Brennan that "the Government should take care before enjoining
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1827 n.4.
112. Id. at 1827.
113. Id. at 1827-28 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 1828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1829 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)).
116. Id. (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.727,
805 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Number 1] 13
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the broadcast of words . . . 'in our land of cultural pluralism."'117 "[The
Court] should be mindful," she wrote, "that words unpalatable to some may
be 'commonplace' for others, 'the stuff of everyday conversations."' 118
The dispute over the possible meanings of the f-word and the
definition of indecency began-for purposes of Fox Television Stations, at
any rate-in oral arguments. "[I]n the last analysis," Justice Stevens said
during the arguments of Carter G. Phillips representing Fox Television,
"we are trying to decide what the word 'indecent' means."11 9 Phillips
agreed.120 Justice Stevens asked next, "[D]oes the number of times the
word is used in a particular context make a difference in the definition?"121
Phillips replied in the negative; the key to the inquiry, he said, is whether
the language describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities and not the
number of times a word is used.122 Justice Stevens asked whether a word
can have two meanings: Is it indecent if used in the context of the meaning
that is not sexual?123 No, Phillips responded; if a word has a sexual and a
non-sexual meaninf and the use of the word is ambiguous, punishment
should not attach.
Later, during the arguments of Solicitor General Gregory G. Garre,
Justice Stevens asked whether the word "dung" would be indecent.125
Probably not, Garre responded, but, "The one thing that can't be disputed []
in this case is that the F-Word is tently offensive under community
standards for the broadcast medium."
Fox Television Stations did not turn on the definition of the f-word,
but the word's definition clearly would be important in the determination of
questions related to whether the First Amendment would allow the FCC to
ban the use of certain words as indecent regardless of context. Historically,
the FCC has only found language indecent if the language was related to
sexual activity or excrement, though prurience is not a requirement for
indecency,127 a definition Justice Scalia seized upon. A sexual but
117. Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
118. Id. (quoting Pacifca, 438 US. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
119. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
1800 (2009) (No.07-582)..
120. Id. at 56.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 56-57.
123. Id. at 56.
124. See id. at 57.
125. Id. at 60.
126. Id. at 60-61.
127. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1806 (2009) (quoting FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978)) (noting that the Court, in Pacifica, had "rejected
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nonprurient use for Justice Scalia would be Cher's statement, 128
"metaphoricall suggest[ing] a sexual act as a means of expressing hostility
to her critics."'
Justices Scalia and Stevens, therefore, ended up representing two
camps on the issue of the definition of the f-word, Justice Scalia arguing
that it always related to sexual activity, and Justice Stevens arguing that
there were nonliteral uses that were not related to sex and, therefore, are not
necessarily indecent. As the Court considers whether a single word can be
banned on the airwaves under the First Amendment, it would do well to
consider a broader examination of that word.
III. ANTECEDENTS TO Fox TELEVISION STATIONS
Because of the undercurrent created by Justices Scalia and Stevens, it
is impossible to discuss fully the significance and ramifications of Fox
Television Stations without considering other Supreme Court cases
focusing on highly offensive language, specifically Cohen v. California and
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation. The f-word
appeared in at least ten other Supreme Court cases, 130 but it was the use of
the broadcasters' argument that the statutory proscription applied only to speech appealing
to the prurient interest," though "the normal definition of 'indecent' merely refers to
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality").
128. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1808.
129. Id. at 1809.
130. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 753-79 app.; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See
also Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3262 (2010) (reference to a convicted felon's home
life); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480 (1993) (a quotation from a black man on
attacking whites after seeing the movie Mississippi Burning); Masson v. New Yorker, Inc.,
501 U.S. 496, 508 (1991) (a quotation attributed to the plaintiff); Morris v. Matthews, 475
U.S. 237, 240-41 n.2 (1986) (a quotation from a written statement by a defendant accused
of murder); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345 n.t (1986) (a statement from an inmate
relating to a threat from another inmate); Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 897-903 app. (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 566 n. 1 (1975) (White, J., dissenting) (quotations from a play); Lucas
v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919, 919 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (reference to a police
officer); Reynolds v. Tennessee, 414 U.S. 1163, 1166 n.4 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (a
chant by demonstrators at a Billy Graham crusade in Tennessee at which President Richard
Nixon appeared); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (per curiam) (threat by a
demonstrator that "We'll take the fucking streets later"). In addition, the Court resolved a
number of cases in which there were allusions to the use of the f-word or derivatives, but the
word itself did not appear in the opinions. See Papish v. Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Mo., 410
U.S. 667, 667-68 (1973) (per curiam); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 909-10 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (members of the Court referred to offensive language with the letters and
symbols, "in--- f---."). But cf Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (similar offensive
language was the subject of the case, but neither the offending words nor the toned-down
substitutes were used); Plummer v. Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 3-4 (1973) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Powell made reference to "a series of absolutely vulgar, suggestive and
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the specific word-and, in Pacifica, of similar words-upon which the
decisions in Cohen and Pacifica turned. Cohen and Pacifica marked a
period by the Court of increased tolerance toward offensive language,131 at
least until Fox Television Stations, when that trend was reversed. The two
cases-and others that followed-could have guided the Court in Fox
Television Stations, but some of those cases, Cohen in particular, were
summarily ignored by most of the Justices,132 and the holding in Pacifica
was twisted out of shape.
A. Cohen and Emotive Speech
Paul Robert Cohen was convicted in Los Angeles Municipal Court of
disturbing the peace by wearing a jacket in the courthouse that bore the
slogan "Fuck the Draft." 33 The conviction was upheld by the California
Court of Appeals' 34 and reversed by the Supreme Court. 35 Justice John
Marshal Harlan's opinion for the Court was an eloquent explication of the
use of langua e and its protection under the speech clause of the First
Amendment.
abhorrent, sexually-oriented statements" that were the subject of the case); See generally
discussion infra Part IV (discussing time period from Chaplinksy to Pico).
131. See Shaman, supra note 7, at 301 (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently
given shelter to more offensive words). See generally discussion infra Part IV (discussing
time period from Chaplinsky to Pico).
132. As previously indicated, the only reference to Cohen is by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1829
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); discussion supra p. 6.
133. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16. The jacket contained other slogans as well, including "Stop
War," and the offensive slogan did not stand out significantly. Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing
Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring
Signficance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283, 286, 286 n.21 (1990). Clearly it
stood out enough for the police officer patrolling the halls of the Los Angeles County
Courthouse to notice it, however. See Transcript of Oral Arguments, Cohen v. California,
reprinted in 70 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 827, 829-30 (Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 1975).
134. People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 503 (1969).
135. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
136. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to
the Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT 60, 93 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds.,
2002) (calling Justice Harlan's opinion "magnanimous"); Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Cohen
v. California: "Inconsequential" Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1251
(1996) (The case "speaks eloquently to values that transcend its facts, and does so in a way
that vindicates core civil liberties;" it also "serves as an exemplar on the importance of
careful judging."). Cohen has also been called the Court's "most thoughtful discussion of
the problem of public civility," DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 107 (2d ed.
2003), and "the Court's most important precedent protecting offensive speech," Lackland H.
Bloom Jr., Fighting Back: Offensive Speech and Cultural Conflict, 46 SMU L. REv. 145,
150 (1992). It has been identified as the first case in which the Court acknowledged "that
there is value in speech such as Cohen's." DOUGLAS M. FRALEIGH & JOSEPH S. TUMAN,
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Justice Harlan began the opinion, however, with what might be
interpreted as an apology: "This case may seem at first blush too
inconsequential to find its way into our books, but the issue it presents is of
no small constitutional significance."13 7 Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justices Hugo Black and Harry Blackmun disagreed with that assessment
by Justice Harlan. Writing for the three dissenters, Justice Blackmun called
"Cohen's absurd and immature antic . . . mainly conduct and little
speech."1 38 The Chief Justice originally intended to offer a separate dissent,
which he reported in a memo to the other Justices as being "the most
restrained I can manage."l39 Wrote the Chief Justice:
I, too, join in a word of protest that this Court's limited resources of
time should be devoted to such a case as this. It is a measure of a lack
of a sense of priorities and with all deference I submit that Mr. Justice
Harlan's "first blush" was the correct reaction. It is nothing short of
absurd nonsense that juvenile delinquents and their emotionally
unstable outbursts should command the attention of this Court. The
appeal sl old be dismissed for failure to present a substantial federal
question.
Never mind that Cohen was not a juvenile, that there was no outburst in the
case, and there was neither evidence nor argument that Cohen was
emotionally unstable. To the contrary, the evidence was that Cohen made
no effort to speak to anyone, he did not threaten any act of violence, he did
not make any loud or unusual noise, and, in fact, he made no sound prior to
his arrest.141 Indeed, Melvin Nimmer, Cohen's attorney, told the Court that
Cohen, who was a witness rather than a party in a case, wore his jacket in
the courthouse corridor, but he removed it and draped it over his arm when
he went into the courtroom so that it was not visible.142 He was not arrested
until a judge refused an officer's request to cite Cohen for contempt of
court.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 156 (1997).
137. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15.
138. Id at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Byron White joined the portion of
Justice Blackmun's dissent questioning whether the construction of the statute by the
California Court of Appeals followed that of the California Supreme Court and writing that
the case should be remanded for reconsideration in light of that court's ruling in In re
Bushman, 463 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1970). Id. at 27-28.
139. Memorandum to the Conference (May 25, 1971), Papers of Justice John Marshall
Harlan, Box 434, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
140. Id. Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Blackmun's dissent and withdrew his own on
June 3, 1971. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to the Conference (May 25, 1971)
(on file with Library of Congress).
141. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16-17 (citation omitted).
142. Transcript of Oral Argument, Cohen v. California, supra note 133, at 828-§29.
143. Id.
17Number I ]
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The explicit complaint of Justice Harry Blackmun, however, and the
implicit complaint of Chief Justice Burger, that the case involved conduct
rather than speech, directly contradicted the holding of the Court. Justice
Harlan wrote that the case dealt with "a conviction resting soleli upon
'speech,'... not upon any separately identifiable conduct .... The
State, Justice Harlan wrote, does not have the power under the First
Amendment to punish Cohen because of the "underlying content of the
message the inscription conveyed," that is, for the position Cohen took "on
the inutility or immorality of the draft . . . ."145 Therefore, it was clear that
the conviction was based "upon the asserted offensiveness of the words"
used to convey the message, that is, upon the word "fuck." 1 46
Also important to the issue, Justice Harlan wrote, was the fact that the
statute applied throughout the state-not just in courthouses' 47 -and the
speech involved did not fall into one of those categories of speech where
the Court has allowed greater regulation-obscenity or fighting words, for
example.148 Specifically, he wrote, for speech to be obscene, it must be "in
some significant way, erotic," and, therefore, though Justice Scalia might
disagree, "[ilt cannot plausibly be maintained that this vulgar allusion to
the Selective Service System would conjure up such psychic stimulation in
anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen's crudely defaced jacket." 49 In
addition, because the four-letter word as used here was not directed at a
person as a personal insult, it did not constitute fighting words,150 and there
was no captive audience because viewers could avert their eyes.1st
Therefore, Justice Harlan wrote, the question is "whether California
can excise as 'offensive conduct' one particularly scurrilous epithet," and
"acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove [the epithet]
from the public vocabulary." 52 And the answer is clearly no, he wrote:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us . ..
144. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18 (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 19.
148. Id. at 19-20.
149. Id at 20.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 21.
152. Id. at 22-23.
153. Id. at 24.
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There may be side effects to this freedom, Justice Harlan wrote, but, "[t]hat
the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not
a sign of weakness but of strength." 54
The "[sltate has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it
is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us," he wrote.155
"[W]hile the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more
distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that
one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."'156 Indeed, he wrote, "in what
otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual
distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly
implicated."',
57
The key finding of the Court, however, particularly as related to the
controversy over offensive language, is that the scope of the First
Amendment's protection extends beyond content to the method of
expression:
Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated
by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a
dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of
relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which,
practically speaking, may often be the more, nportant element of the
overall message sought to be communicated.
Indeed, Justice Harlan wrote that forbidding certain words raised a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas: "[G]overnments might soon seize
upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning
the expression of unpopular views." 159 Therefore, in the absence of a
particularized and compelling reason, the state cannot make the use of "this
single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."1 60
Though Chief Justice Burger had withdrawn his dissent, it was clear
he found the offending word particularly troubling. Apparently, he lobbied
both Justices Harlan and Nimmer to refrain from using it in the courtroom.
According to journalists Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, while the
154. Id. at 25.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id. at 25-26.
159. Id. at 26. See also Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 1253 (Justice Harlan recognized
that "[u]ltimately, the ability to define language becomes the ability to control thoughts.").
160. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
19
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members of the Court were robing, the Chief Justice asked Justice Harlan
not to use the word, and Harlan assented. 161 More than three months
earlier, when oral arguments in the case were held, the Chief Justice also
attempted to signal Nimmer that he should not use the word. "[Y]ou may
proceed whenever you are ready," Burger said. "I might suggest to you
that, as in most cases, the Court is thoroughly familiar with the factual
setting of this case and it will not be necessary for you, I'm sure, to dwell
on the facts."' 62
Nimmer was not as accommodating as Justice Harlan. He did not
immediately make reference to Cohen's jacket, but in responding to a
question by Justice Blackmun as to why Cohen was in the courthouse,
Nimmer reported that Cohen was walking in the corridor "wearing a jacket
upon which were inscribed the words 'Fuck the Draft.' Also inscribed were
the words 'Stop War,' and several peace symbols."l63 Neither the Chief
Justice nor any other member of the Court responded to the use of the
word.1 64
The Cohen case caused many a chuckle during its journey through the
judicial system.165 More recently, however, it has been recognized because
of its value in protecting political speech as well as offensive language. The
case, one scholar wrote, "involves nothing less than the scope of the First
Amendment's protection of core political speech and the ability of the
government to prohibit disfavored means of political expression.',166
Scholars also found that the opinion "reflects the very best of the
161. BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 133 (1979).
162. Transcript of Oral Arguments, Cohen v. California, supra note 133, at 828.
163. Id. See also Farber, supra note 133, at 286 n.21. Apparently, Nimmer strongly
believed that "he had to use that word, and not some euphemism, in his oral argument to
make his point that its use could not be banned from all public discussion." William S.
Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1595, 1599 (1987)
[hereinafter William S. Cohen].
164. Apparently, attorneys arguing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. were more
accommodating. Justice Ginsburg, in a speech to the conference of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, was reported as saying the attorneys had been told that
some of the Justices might find the use of the word unseemly. Tony Mauro, Ginsburg
Clears up Mystery About "Fleeting Expletives" Case, THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (June 14,
2009, 9:29 AM), http://legaltimes.typepad.comIblt/2009/06/ginsburg-clears-up-mystery-
about-fleeting-expletives-case.html.
165. See William S. Cohen, supra note 163, at 1595 (writing that only Paul Robert
Cohen's attorney, Melville Nimmer, thought the case was of any constitutional
significance).
166. Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 1252.
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'marketplace of ideas' paradigm first espoused by Justice Holmes in
Abrams."1 67
Some question remains, however, as to whether Cohen is directly
applicable to Pacifica.168
B. Pacifica and "Words You Never Say"
The facts and likely misapplication of Pacifica have been discussed
previously.169 Pacifica, just as Cohen did, turned on the use of language.
Unlike Cohen, however, Pacifica involved broadcast indecency, yet the
holding was controlled by a coalition of Justices who objected to the words
used regardless of any broader context of their use. Underlying Justice
Stevens' opinion-particularly those parts that were for a plurality rather
than a majority-was a myopic view of offensive speech. Indeed, he lost
the votes of Justices Lewis Powell and Harry Blackmun specifically
because he addressed the value of such words.170
Key to the holding that the George Carlin monologue was indecent as
broadcast was the finding by Justice Stevens that the words used were of
slight value in the marketplace. In some circumstances, Justice Stevens
wrote, the offensive words are protected, but, he added, "they surely lie at
the periphery of First Amendment concern."171 The FCC, he wrote, does
not object to the point of view expressed in the monologue, but to the way
it was expressed.172 Therefore, the FCC ban on indecency would affect
only form and not content. 173 And that is a good thing: "There are few, if
any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, emphasized the narrow
holding.175 He wrote that the case did not turn on the value or lack thereof
167. Id. at 1253. See also Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech:
Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 281, 314-317 (1974).
168. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying discussion.
169. See discussion accompanying supra notes 70-72, 100-07.
170. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(noting departure from Part W of the Opinion of the Court because it is not for Justices to
determine the value of speech and, hence, which speech is more deserving of protection).
171. Id. at 743. See also id. at 746 ("Some uses of even the most offensive words are
unquestionably protected.").
172. Id. at 746 n.22. Ironically, one point of the monologue was that many in society
have a silly attitude toward language. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying discussion.
173. Id. at 743 n.18.
174. Id.
175. Id at 760-61 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the FCC holding does not prevent
Pacifica from broadcasting the monologue during the late evening hours and does not speak
to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word).
21
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of Carlin's monologue, but on "the unique characteristics of the broadcast
media, combined with society's right to protect its children" from such
language.' 7 6
Justice Brennan also objected to Justice Stevens' evaluation of the
value of the language involved.' 77 The ruling, he wrote, can be viewed as
"another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force those groups
who do not share its mores to conform to its way of thinking, acting, and
speaking."1 78 It is "transparently fallacious," Justice Brennan wrote, to
think that "the content of a message and its potential impact on any who
might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the vehicle for its
expression."' 7 9 Agreeing with Justice Harlan's expansive view of language
and its use in Cohen, Justice Brennan wrote, "[a] given word may have a
unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an
image." Justice Brennan also found a disturbing vein running through
the opinions of Justices Stevens and Powell. There was, he wrote:
[A] depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of cultural
pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the
Members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities.
It is only an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to
approve the c9 sorship of communications solely because of the words
they contain.
Words, he wrote, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, are not "crystal,
transparent and unchanged," but are "the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
time in which it is used.',182 The words the Court and the FCC find so
unpalatable, Justice Brennan writes, "may be the stuff of everyday
conversation in some, if not many, of the innumerable subcultures that
compose this Nation." 183 Indeed, the Pacifica Foundation argued that
Carlin was not merely "mouthing obscenities" but was using specific words
176. Id. at 762.
177. This was not Brennan's only objection. He criticized the Court's characterization of
a radio listener as being a passive member of a captive audience: The listener makes a
decision to take part in an ongoing public discourse "if only as a listener." Id. at 765
(Brennan, J., dissenting). He also criticized the Court for usurping the role of parents,
particularly some parents who might want their children to hear the program, and with
usurping the responsibility of the public to weed out worthless and offensive
communications from the public airways. Id. at 770-72.
178. Id. at 777.
179. Id at 773.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 775.
182. Id. at 776 (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
183. Id
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to satirize as harmless and silly attitudes toward those words.184 Justice
Brennan wrote:
In confirming Carlin's prescience as a social commentator by the result
it reaches today, the Court evinces an attitude toward the "seven dirty
words" that many others besides Mr. Carlin and Pacifica might
describe as "silly." Whether today's decision will similajV5 prove
"harmless" remains to be seen. One can only hope that it will.
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan's hopes were misplaced; the opinion did
not prove to be harmless.
IV. CHAPLINSKY, COHEN AND BEYOND
Cohen and Pacifica were language-based decisions, but-for the
majority in Pacifica, at any rate-the contexts of the two cases were
sufficiently different, making Cohen inapplicable to the later case.186
Cohen was quoted in Pacifica with regard to the use of the language, but
not on point in support of the ultimate holding. Cohen focused on the
content of the message, that is, the specific use of an offending word and
the meaning of that word. Pacifica, on the other hand, focused primarily on
the context of the broadcast-that the offending language was repeated at a
time when children were likely to be in the audience. The issue decided in
Cohen, as one writer observed, was "whether the state, acting as a
paternalistic guardian of public morality, could ban the use of certain words
in all contexts."18 7 The issue in Pacfica was whether the FCC could ban
the use of indecent language in the middle of the afternoon. Therefore,
"Cohen, although not wholly irrelevant, has little to say for cases such as
Pacifca."88
As Justice Brennan so eloquently pointed out, however, Pacifica
transcended the issues of context and drew upon issues related to the value
of speech. Justice Harlan, for example, established in Cohen that offensive
speech may not be regulated simply because another category of speech-
obscenity-can be regulated.189 Justice Stevens, on the other hand, relied
upon an analogy between indecency and obscenity. The words Carlin used,
Justice Stevens wrote:
[O]ffend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. Their place in the
hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr.
Justice Murphy when he said: "[S]uch utterances are no essential part
184. Id.
185. Id. at 777.
186. See Farber, supra note 133, at 294.
187. Id. (emphasis in original).
188. Id. at 285.
189. See William S. Cohen, supra note 163, at 1610.
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of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from tn is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
That is, the words do not rise to the level of First Amendment protection
because they possess insufficient value.
Both Cohen and Pacifica, therefore, demonstrate the ways bias
against certain words can impact decisions in important First Amendment
cases. Indeed, one commentator praised Justice Harlan's opinion because
of its ability to transcend "the strong emotional pull" of the facts.191 The
emotional response, he wrote, snared the four dissenters, just as it snared
Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Texas v. Johnson.192
Justice Stevens' reliance on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is also
telling. Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted of using
offensive words in public for calling a police officer a "God damned
racketeer" and "a damned Fascist"-relatively tame epithets by today's
standards.193 Chaplinsky claimed protection under the First Amendment, 9 4
but a unanimous Court found that the words lie outside of the free-speech
guarantee. The Court held:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from Iem is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.
The doctrine spawned in that case has lived a schizophrenic life. One could
argue that the Court created three-or four--categories of speech that lie
outside the protection of the First Amendment: (1) the insulting or fighting
words that inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,
(2) "the lewd and obscene, the profane," and (3) the libelous. Libel and
190. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
191. Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 1255.
192. Id. See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
193. 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942). See also Shaman, supra note 7, at 303.
194. 315 U.S. at 569.
195. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
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obscenity, however, have been pulled out of the schema and addressed in
separate lines of cases.196
The Court has paid lip service to the notion that fighting words are not
protected, but it has all but gutted the proposition. While there has been
some dispute over the definition of "fighting words" and what words did or
did not fall into that narrow category of speech,' 9 7 since Chaplinsky, no
court has seriously questioned the fighting words doctrine; it has been
settled law that fighting words are not protected. 1 Chaplinsky, however,
was the last case in which the Court has upheld a conviction under the
fighting words doctrine.199
In addition, the Court seems to have ignored language in Chaplinsky
relegating lewd and profane speech to unprotected status; at least that is the
point made by a number of Justices who have objected to offensive
language and have called upon that rubric when voting to uphold
regulations prohibiting such language. 200 For example, when the Court
ruled that a student could not be expelled from a public university because
she had used the term "mother flicker" in an article she wrote for an
underground newspaper,201 Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices
William Rehnquist and Harry Blackmun dissented. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the trio, found the use of the term "lewd and obscene" as that
phrase was used in Chaplinsky.202 The notion that university officials
cannot control the university environment is unacceptable, he wrote, "and I
would suspect would have been equally unacceptable to the Framers of the
First Amendment." 203 Chief Justice Burger agreed. That a state university
196. Libel under the First Amendment has been explicated in a line of cases beginning
with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and obscenity in a line of cases
beginning with Roth v. United States., 354 U.S. 476 (1957). One may argue that the second
category delineated in Chaplinsky-once obscenity has been removed-is actually two
categories, lewd and profane, but a determination on that point is not necessary for this
discussion.
197. Justice Scalia, for example, pointed out in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, that fighting
words had been defined as having "no essential part" of a search for truth, rather than
having "no part." 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (emphasis in original).
198. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972).
199. See Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument
for its Interment, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1993) [hereinafter Demise Note].
200. See id. See also Shaman, supra note 7, at 302.
201. Papish v. Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 667-68 (1973) (per curiam).
The offending language did not appear in the per curiam opinion or in Justice Rehnquist's
dissent. See supra note 130.
202. Id. at 676 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 677.
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could not control such "obscene and infantile" conduct, he wrote in a
separate dissent, is "curious-even bizarre ... ."204
The Justices had made similar arguments a year earlier in three cases
that were handed down on the same day. The judgments in Rosenfeld v.
New Jersey,205 Lewis v. New Orleans, 20 and Brown v. Oklahoma were
vacated and the cases remanded in light of the opinions handed down in
Cohen and another earlier case, Gooding v. Wilson. 20 8
In Gooding, the Court ruled that a Georgia statute prohibiting the use
of "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of
the peace"209 was unconstitutional because the definitions of the offending
words went beyond the "fighting words" category identified in
Chaplinsky.210 Georgia courts, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority, had
applied the statute to utterances that were not fighting words. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun again dissented because of what they saw as
a narrow reading of Chaplinsky.211 The offensive language-calling a
police officer a "[w]hite son of a bitch" and threatening to choke him to
death and to cut his partner to pieces-constituted fighting words, Justice
Blackmun wrote for the dissenters.212 Finding that the words are protected,
he wrote, constitutes little more than "paying lip service to Chaplinsky,"
which, though it remains good law, is being eviscerated by the Court.2 13
The Chief Justice wrote in a separate dissent that the case placed outside
the protection of the First Amendment several narrowly-defined classes of
speech, but the Court was eliminating from consideration all categories of
speech except for fighting words.21 "Indeed," he wrote, "the language
used by the Chaplinsky Court to describe words properly subject to
regulation bears a striking resemblance to that of the Georgia statute, which
was enacted many, many years before Chaplinsky was decided." 215
Rosenfeld, Lewis, and Brown, decided almost exactly one year after
Cohen, involved another of those types of unprotected speech Burger and
Blackmun said were enumerated in Chaplinsky but later ignored. The three
204. Id. at 672 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
205. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
206. 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
207. 408 U.S. 914 (1972).
208. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
209. Id. at 519 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303).
210. Id. at 525.
211. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in Gooding. Id. at 528.
212. Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 536-37.
214. See id. at 529 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
215. Id.
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cases grew from the use of the term "mother fucker." David Rosenfeld used
the term four times during remarks he made at a meeting of a local school
board;216 Wilbert Brown used it in reference to police officers during a
meeting at the Universi of Tulsa chapel;217 and Mallie Lewis used it to
address police officers.
Justice Powell dissented in Rosenfeld and concurred with the result in
the other two cases. Rosenfeld's language, he wrote, was "so grossly
offensive and emotionally disturbing" that it was the proper subject of
criminal prosecution. 219 "[T]he good taste and restraint" of the audience
"made it unlikely that physical violence would result," so the words could
not be considered fighting words.220 "But," he noted, "the exception to
First Amendment protection recognized in Chaplinsky is not limited to
words whose mere utterance entails a high probability of an outbreak of
physical violence. It also extends to the willful use of scurrilous language
calculated to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling audience." He
called Rosenfeld's speech "a verbal assault" on the audience. 222
Though similar language was used, Justice Powell distinguished the
other two cases. In Lewis, he wrote that the offensive words may have
caused a physical response if addressed by one citizen to another, but they
were addressed to a police officer "trained to exercise a higher degree of
restraint than the average citizen."223 Justice Powell did not attempt to
explain how the case was distinguished from Chaplinsky, where the
offending words were also addressed to a police officer and, arguably, were
not as virulent as those expressed in Lewis. In Brown, Justice Powell wrote,
the statute was considerably broader than that in Rosenfeld, and Wilbert
Brown had been asked to attend a meeting to present the Black Panther
216. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 910 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
language upon which the case was based did not appear in the Court's order or in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent. See supra note 130.
217. Id. at 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the defendant's actions in Brown v.
Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972)).
218. Id. at 909 (describing defendant's actions in Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913
(1972)). The language upon which the case was based did not appear in the Court's order or
in Justice Rehnquist's dissent. See supra note 130.
219. 408 U.S. at 906 (Powell, J., dissenting). He was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun. Id. at 903.
220. Id. at 905.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 906. Justice Powell dissented for the same reason in Plummer v. Columbus,
414 U.S. 2, 4 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). He was joined by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 3.
223. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring),
quoted with approval in City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987).
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political viewpoint. Therefore, "language of the character charged might
well have been anticipated by the audience." 224
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun were not
so discriminating. The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist wrote dissents in
the three cases complaining of the offensive language, both dissents joined
by Justice Blackmun. The three joined opinions by the Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist covering all three cases, and both opinions complained of
the offensive language. The language used by Lewis constituted fighting
words, Justice Rehnquist wrote, and that of Rosenfeld and Brown was
lewd, obscene, and profane, as those terms are used in Chaplinsky.225
Therefore, in each instance, the language "clearly falls within the class of
punishable utterances . . . .',226 Chief Justice Burger agreed with Justice
Powell that Rosenfeld's remarks might not have caused an immediate
breach of the peace, but that their offensiveness might well have prompted
someone to have taken action after the meeting.227
The Lewis case returned to the Court two years later, and the three
dissenting Justices continued their attack on offensive language. For the
three dissenters, Justice Blackmun wrote that the holding in Lewis was
wrong, just as the holding in Gooding had been.228 The language uttered to
the police officer, he wrote, "'plainly' was profane, 'plainly' it was
insulting, and 'plainly' it was fighting."22 9
Finally, two months later, the Court vacated the conviction of a man
for referring to a North Little Rock police officer with the term "mother
fucker."230 Justice Blackmun, joined again by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, wrote that he was at a loss to understand what more the
Court needed to affirm the conviction. The Arkansas Supreme Court, he
wrote, held that words could be punished if they were addressed to or about
a person within that person's hearing, fitting the Chaplinsky
requirement.2 3 1
224. Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914, 914 (1972).
225. Rosenfeld, 408 U.S. at 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 912.
227. Id. at 903 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice did
not attempt to reconcile the contradiction his "after the meeting" example presents to the
specific language defining fighting words as requiring an "immediate" breach of the peace.
228. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
229. Id. at 141.
230. Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974).
231. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Two other cases involved offensive language,
but neither dissent focused specifically on the offensiveness of the language used. In Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), Justice Rehnquist complained that there were insufficient
facts for the Court to justify its holding that a threat that "[wle'll take the fucking street
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In the late 1970s and beyond, the Court confronted uses of offensive
language in contexts more formal than "verbal assaults." No one was
verbally assaulted in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,232 for
example, but three of the dissenting Justices believed that the city of
Chattanooga should be allowed to prohibit the showing of Hair because of
the play's content.233 Ironically, Justice Blackmun broke from the
dissenting coalition to write for the Court that the ban constituted
unconstitutional prior restraint.234 Justice Byron White, however, provided
quotes from the play to demonstrate its offensive nature,235 and he wrote
that, based on such content, the First Amendment did not compel the city to
permit its production in city-owned facilities.236 Justice Rehnquist added
that a city had the power to preserve the property under its control, and that
is what Chattanooga was doing.237
Justice Powell used a tactic similar to Justice White's seven years
later in his dissent to the holding in Board of Education, Island Trees
Union Free School District v. Pico. A plurality had held that school boards
could not constitutionally remove books from school libraries because the
board did not like the contents of those books.238 Justice Powell's opinion
focused on the powers that local school boards should have over schools
within their jurisdictions,239 but he could not resist pointing out what he
thought to be the offensive nature of the books in question. He supplied a
seven-page appendix with multiple examples of the offensive words in the
books.
Justices on the Supreme Court and judges on other courts who
struggle with offensive language can be excused for their objections to the
f-word. The word has a troublesome history, and Justices are not the first
members of society who have difficulty defining it. A definition is
later" constituted neither fighting words nor a public nuisance. Id. at 109-11 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). And in Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974), Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, wrote that there was no basis for the Court's
ruling that the use of the term "chicken shit" was insufficient for finding the speaker in
contempt of court. Id. The Court, he wrote, substituted its own judgment to find that the
contempt conviction was based solely on the use of the expletive. Id. at 707-08 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
232. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
233. Id. at 564-74 (White, J., dissenting; Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 559.
235. Id. at 566 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 567.
237. Id. at 571 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
238. 457 U.S. 853, 871-72 (1982) (plurality opinion).
239. Id. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 897-903 app.
29
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essential, however, to the way the word is regulated under the First
Amendment.
V. WHEN DOES F*** NOT MEAN F***?
In 1959, Judge Frederick van Pelt Bryan of the United States Court
for the Southern District of New York ruled that the state's postmaster
general had overstepped his authority when he found Lady Chatterly 's
Lover to be obscene and, therefore, not fit to be mailed.241 ,'There is no
doubt of [the book's] literary merit," Judge Bryan wrote.242 The book was
"replete with fine writing and with descriptive passages of rare beauty,"
and, therefore, not obscene, even though it contained "a number of
passages describing sexual intercourse in great detail with complete candor
and realism" and with the frequent use of "[flour-letter Anglo-Saxon
words." 243
Time has found the judge to be correct in his assessment of the
literary value of the novel, but just as Justice Scalia was wrong in his
characterization of the f-word's meaning,244 Judge Bryan may not have
been fully accurate in his assessment of the word's origins.245
The two characterizations, however, exemplify the long-standing
controversy over, and frequent misunderstanding about, the word. It has
been considered, since "time out of mind," 246 one of the most-if not the
most-egregious of offensive words.247 Both Justice Scalia and the FCC
241. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd
276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
242. Id. at 500.
243. Id. A judicial reference to the f-word being of Anglo-Saxon origin pre-dated the
Lady Chatterly's Lover case. In 1933, in the same court, Judge John M. Woosley, ruling that
James Joyce's novel Ulysses was not obscene, wrote that "[t]he words which are criticized
as dirty are old Saxon words known to almost all men and, I venture, to many women, and
are such words as would be naturally and habitually used, I believe, by the types of folk
whose life, physical and mental, Joyce is seeking to describe." United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). A similar reference appeared in
the Second Circuit's opinion in the Grove Press case. 276 F.2d at 440.
244. Compare Justice Scalia's definition of the word, FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812 (2009), with the definitions discussed at infra notes 292-308.
245. Many authorities agree that the origins of "fuck" are unknown. See, e.g., ASHLEY
MONTAGU, THE ANATOMY OF SWEARING 307 (1967); RUTH WAJNRYB, EXPLETIVE DELETED
$&#@*!: A GOOD LOOK AT BAD LANGUAGE 52, 55 (2005); Allen Walker Read, An
Obscenity Symbol, 9 AM. SPEECH 264, 267-69 (1934).
246. The phrase was used by the Supreme Court in a public forum case, but its use here
seems applicable. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Streets and
parks, "time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.").
247. See RICHARD DOOLING, BLUE STREAK: SWEARING, FREE SPEECH, AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT 18 (1996) ("For centuries, flick was the most objectionable word in the
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have said as much,248 and scholars have agreed. Ashley Montagu wrote
that the word is "the nonpareil of all the foulest and most inadmissible of
all swear-words, four-lettered or otherwise," 249 and Allen Walker Read
called it "the most disreputable of all English words . . . .'250 Sociologist
Edward Sagarin wrote, "In the entire language of proscribed words, from
slang to profanity, from the mildly unclean to the utterly obscene, including
terms relating to concealed parts of the body, to excretion and excrement as
well as to sexuality, one word reigns supreme, unchallenged in its
,,251preeminence.
In movies, an eight-year-old boy called it the "queen mother" of curse
words,252 and a blogger speculated that her use of the word was one reason
she is hated by the subject of her blog.253 The word was part of a
vocabulary that may have cost Edward Albee a Pulitzer Prize for his play
Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?,254 and there have been debates for
centuries as to whether the word should appear in dictionaries and, if it
should, how it should be handled.255 Indeed, in 1954, psychiatrist Leo
Stone complained that "scholarly information about this important word is
remarkable for its scarcity . . . . No reliable American or English general
dictionaries now current contain the word."2 56 The Oxford English
Dictionary began including entries in the early 1970s, and the editors of the
Random House Dictionary of the Enlish Language "agonized for decades"
before the first inclusion in 1987. The first appearance of the word in
movies was in 1970,258 and the word did not appear in The New York Times
English language. . . .").
248. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1809 (quoting Golden Globes Order,
supra note 18, at 4979).
249. MONTAGU, supra note 245, at 303. Despite his hyperbole in calling "fuck" the only
four-letter word in the English language, Montagu lists six other "four-letter words": cunt,
cock, arse, shit, piss, and fart. Id. at 315-18.
250. Read, supra note 245, at 267.
251. EDWARD SAGARIN, THE ANATOMY OF DIRTY WORDS 136 (1962).
252. A CHRISTMAS STORY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1983).
253. JULIE AND JULIA (Columbia Pictures 2009).
254. See EDWIN BATTISTELLA, BAD LANGUAGE: ARE SOME WORDS BETTER THAN
OTHERS? 68 (2005).
255. See id. at 79-80; DOOLING, supra note 247, at 17-27; WAJNRYB, supra note 245, at
5, 39, 59, 64; Read, supra note 243, at 269-74.
256. Leo Stone, On the Principal Obscene Word of the English Language (An Inquiry,
with Hypothesis, Regarding its Origin and Persistence), 35 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIs 30,
31(1954).
257. WAJNRYB, supra note 245, at 5.
258. Jesse Sheidlower, Introduction: About the F-Word, in THE F-WORD xxvi (Jesse
Sheidlower ed., Random House 2d ed. 1999). The movies were MASH and Myra
Breckenridge. Id
31
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until the newspaper printed the report on the independent counsel's
investigation of Bill Clinton, which contained the word in a quotation from
Monica Lewinsky.259
Despite its disrepute, some authorities today propose that the f-word,
because of its increasino use, is slipping in its position as the most
egregious of foul words. At least two writers have referred to its use as
ubiquitous 261 which, they claim, results in its lessened impact as an
expletive.26 That is, the word is losing some of its power because of its
increased use. Jesse Sheidlower, a senior editor in the Random House
reference department, wrote in 1999, that taboos against the word are
"weaker than ever," 6 and linguist Ruth Wajnryb, wrote that there is some
question as to whether the word retains its power as an intensifier. "[I]ts
emotive force," she writes, "is nearing exhaustion," 264 so that nowadays, "it
takes more FUCKs to achieve what one lone FUCK would have achieved
ten years ago."265 Edwin Battistella wrote that it might even be entering
more sophisticated circles, still improper, but, at the same time, rebellious
and respectable. "In the context of this cultural split," he wrote, "the use of
vulgar language can provide covert prestige to otherwise conventional
speakers." Noting that both John Kerry and Dick Cheney used it during
a presidential campaign, Battistella wrote that each positioned himself "as a
speaker who puts directness over convention."267 Attorney Richard
Dooling writes that the distinction of being the most objectionable word in
the English language is now held jointly by "nigger" and "cunt," and 'fuck
has at long last stepped down."268
There is no doubt that attitudes toward the word are changing or have
changed. In the first half of the twentieth century, a journalist could write
259. Id. at xxv.
260. See WA.NRYB, supra note 245, at 41, 44.
261. See CHRISTOPHER M. FAIRMAN, FUCK: WORD TABOO AND PROTECTING OUR FIRST
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES 13 (2009); WAJNRYB, supra note 245, at 40.
262. WAJNRYB, supra note 245, at 44. Wajnryb also quotes the Collins Australian
Dictionary as reporting that "[t]he use and overuse of FUCK in everyday speech of many
people has led, to some extent, to a lessening of its impact" though "the word still retains its
shock value . . . ." Id. at 41.
263. Shiedlower, supra note 258, at xx.
264. WAJNRYB, supra note 245, at 64.
265. Id. at 40.
266. BATTISTELLA, supra note 254, at 77.
267. Id. See also Farber, supra note 133, at 295 (The word "has become considerably
more acceptable in what used to be called 'polite society."').
268. DOOLING, supra note 247, at 18. See also Cruff v. H.K., 778 N.W.2d 764 (N.D.
2010) (affirming a juvenile court's finding that the use of the word "nigger" constituted
disorderly conduct).
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 32 2011-2012
Number 1] PROTECTING EMOTIVE SPEECH 33
an article about profanity without referring to the f-word,269 and a linguist
could write an article specifically about the word without using it.270
Indeed, Dooling wrote that Allen W. Read's article in American Speech
titled "An Obscenity Symbol," contained "evething you would want to
know about the f-word, except how to spell it." 71 But even in 1934, Read
noted that "the use of the word is widespread and a set of derivatives and
combinatives has developed."272 Twenty years later, Stone also reported
ample use of the word, even as he complained about the lack of scholarly
study.27 3
Stone's complaint is no longer applicable, as a word search in
virtually any scholarly database will demonstrate. In recent years, there has
been the distribution of at least one book,274 one movie,275 and one law
journal article276 each with the one-word title: Fuck. Another book is titled
The F- Word,277 and yet another author claims that his law journal article
delineates the types of cases where American courts have adjudicated
disputes involving the word, and how they have resolved those disputes.278
Despite all that, the word retains much of its taboo status. No
authority argues that the word has become so commonplace that its use
would be uniformly accepted in polite society.279 Writer Roy Blount Jr., for
269. See H. L. Mencken, American Profanity, 19 AM. SPEECH 241 (1944).
270. See Read, supra note 245.
271. DOOLING, supra note 247, at 41.
272. Read, supra note 245, at 275. See also id. at 274 ("In recent years our word has
gained greater currency .... ).
273. See Stone, supra note 256, at 30-31.
274. FAIRMAN, supra note 261.
275. FUCK (Rainstorm Entertainment 2005).
276. Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOzo L. REV. 1711 (2007). This article was
expanded into the book with the same title. FAIRMAN, supra note 261. Each work seems to
be more of an excuse to use the word than to treat the issue seriously. For example, the first
two words of the article-immediately after the one-word title-are "Oh fuck." Fairman,
Fuck, CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1711. The author keeps his promise that the reader would
find no "sanitized version" of the word in the article. Id. In sixty pages, he uses the word
more than 560 times (not counting the table of contents and the footnotes), for an average of
more than nine times per page, and has such playful subheads as "Fuck History" and "Fuck
Jurisprudence." Similarly, the author begins chapter one of the book this way: "Oh fuck.
Let's just get this out of the way." FAIRMAN, supra note 261, at 1. Yet, in the fifteen-page
prologue, the author had used the word at least thirty-five times. Id at vii-xxii. And, the
word appeared in the titles of eight of the sixteen chapters listed in the table of contents. It is
unclear, therefore, what the author was attempting to "get out of the way."
277. THE F-WoRD (Jesse Sheidlower ed., Random House 2d ed. 1999).
278. Robert F. Blomquist, The F-Word: A Jurisprudential Taxonomy of American
Morals (In a Nutshell), 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 65, 68 (1999). Professor Blomquist does
not delineate his methodology for the selection of the cases he discusses.
279. Edwin Battistella reports that taboos also continue strong against racial and etimic
epithets. BATTISTELLA, supra note 254, at 82-83. Of the f-word, Wajnryb writes: "Its only
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example, argued in a foreword to a book that "define[d] and trace[d]
through history every use of fuck known to man," 280 that the use of the
word is decreasingly egregious, but admitted, "if my parents were alive I
would not be writing this." 81
The taboo status of the word is tied in large part to its primary
definition, which, of course, relates to sex. Historically, Allen Read writes,
sexual and excretory areas were thought to have magical significance and,
therefore, the use of words related to those areas of life for insult and
opprobrium was a "verbal extension of phallic symbolism." 282 Absent the
magic, Montagu writes that four-letter words are deemed obscene because
they refer to an aspect of life that has long been considered filthy. He
credits the Christian church with being largely responsible for casting sex
in the light of uncleanness.283 There is no language to comfortably talk
about sex, Wajnryb writes, casting the light of the taboo on all references to
sex, but particularly on "fuck." There are many euphemism, she writes, but,
"they're all beating around the bush in comparison to the simple FUCK,
which, it's been argued, has the virtues of brevity, sturdiness, adaptability,
expressiveness, and comprehensibility."284 She writes: "[T]here is no other
word for FUCK that means FUCK."28 5 That is, of course, the key to the
current debate: What is the definition of "fuck?"
Wajnryb highlighted the unique character of the word-the character
that makes it "the hands-down winner in terms of morphological
flexibility."286 Blount writes: "It's one of the best things we can do with
someone, one of the worst to someone. And this is how we make people! . .
. Do it too casually and we get broken homes, diseases . .. and unwanted
babies." 287
power is in the underlying taboo, and that's not going anywhere. It's re-morphing, changing
the way it operates. Over time, FUCK will probably be replaced by something more
immediately potent." WAJNRYB, supra note 245, at 65.
280. Roy Blount Jr., Foreword to THE F-WORD, supra note 277, at xiii.
281. Id. at xi.
282. Read, supra note 245, at 274-75.
283. MONTAGU, supra note 245, at 301.
284. WAJNRYB, supra note 245, at 48.
285. Id. at 47. This seems to contradict Wajnryb's own argument at supra note 264-66,
and Blount agrees with the point made here. He writes: "[Tihe F-word is a fact of life. It
thrives. Repression has not effaced it, nor can even this exhaustive taxonomy run it into the
ground." Blount, supra note 280, at xv. There exists some debate, therefore, on the
continued power of the word, though there is no disagreement that its continued use is
assured.
286. Wajnryb, supra note 245, at 43.
287. Blount, supra note 280, at xi.
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George Carlin said much of the same thing in the monologue that
became the centerpiece of Pacifica. Carlin recognized that the f-word was
considered by society to be particularly heinous, but he also recognized
its dual character:
It's an interesting word too.. . . It leads a double life .... First of all,
it means, sometimes, most of the time, fuck. What does it mean? It
means to make love . . . . And it also means the beginning of life, it's
the act that begins life, so there's the word hanging around with words
like love, and life, and yet on the other hand, it's also a word that we
really use to hurt each other with, man. It's a heavy. It's one that you
have toward the end of the argument. (laughter) Right? (11 uhter) You
finally can't make out. Oh, fuck you man. I said, fuck you.
The focus of the Scalia-Stevens debate-essentially the Fox-FCC debate-
is on whether the word must always be defined in relation to its sexual
connotation. That is, does "fuck" ever have a definition that will cast it
outside the net of broadcast indecency? 290 The FCC and the Supreme Court
say "no." Most authorities disagree. They are virtually unanimous in their
answers to the question: There are many nonsexual definitions for
"fuck.",291
The Oxford English Dictionary has three entries for "fuck"-a noun,
a verb, and an interjection-and while the noun and verb entries define the
word in terms of sexual intercourse, they also list dozens of definitions that
have nothing to do with the sex act, including:292
* "A worthless or despicable person."
* "An intensifier expressing annoyance, hostility, urgency,
exasperation, etc."
* "Expressing anger, despair, frustration, alarm, etc."
* "To damage, ruin, spoil, botch. . . ."
288. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 753 app. (1978).
289. Id. at 754 app.
290. For broadcast purposes, indecent language is "language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
media, sexual or excretory activities or organs, at times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Found. Station WBAl (FM), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975)
[hereinafter Complaint Against Pacifica]. See also supra notes 103-06 and accompanying
discussion.
291. For example, Richard Dooling writes: "Almost all dirty-word antiquarians agree ...
that 'Fuck you!' has very little to do with cupidity or heterosexual copulation, and indeed
probably has much more to do with the abject humiliation of enforced buggery." DOOLNG,
supra note 247, at 12. While he may be overstating the point, he is essentially correct in his
assessment of the use and definition of the word. See WILLIAM GASS, ON BEING BLUE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1975).
292. Fuck Definition, OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oed.com
(follow "I. Fuck, n." and follow "flck, v." and follow "fuck, int.").
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* "To cheat .... "
In addition, the dictionary contains twenty-six separate related entries,
from "fuckability" to "fuck you." 293 Even some dictionaries of slang usage
do not list as many entries. For example, Eric Partridge, in A Dictionary of
Historical Slang, lists twenty-four entries for "fuck" or related words.294
Most have sexual connotations, but he also lists "[e]xpressive of extreme
skepticism, to play the fool," and a "variant of damn all."295 John Ayto and
John Simpson list similar definitions among the five entries they report in
The Oxford Dictionary of Modern Slang. Definitions include: to fool about
(fuck about), to make a mess of (fuck up), to go away, and an expression of
contemptuous or angry rejection (both fuck off).296 Nearly fifty years after
his first dictionary, Partridge provides fifty-four entries of the word or its
derivatives in A Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English.297 In
addition to definitions with sexual connotations, he lists "fuck up" as "[tlo
fail dismally," and "fuck you" as "[t]he strongest of low condemnations,
and never meant literally," like "damn you." 298
In addition, Random House published a book consisting entirely of
definitions of "fuck" and its derivatives. The F- Word was edited by Jesse
Sheidlower, a senior editor in Random House's reference department, and
contains some 270 pages of definitions, following a foreword by writer
Roy Blount Jr. and an introduction by the editor.299
Authorities note that it is the use of the word that removes it from its
sexual context. When a person is in a high emotional pitch and, as a result,
swears, Dooling writes that the person cares not what the swear words
mean-they are used as means of assault or other expression of frustration
and are used interchangeably. In such a context, when attempting to define
the word, "'Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use."' 3 00 Linguist
Wajnryb agrees. During highly emotional experiences, she writes, there is a
"flooding out" and "the actual expletive used is functionally
immaterial." 30'l "Fuck," however, is a likely choice for an expletive
293. Id.
294. ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF HISTORICAL SLANG 349 (abr. by Jacqueline
Simpson, Penguin Books 1972) (1937).
295. Id.
296. JOHN AYTO & JOHN SIMPSoN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN SLANG 75
(1992).
297. ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH 432-33
(1984).
298. Id. at 432.
299. See generally SHEIDLOWER, supra note 258.
300. DOOLING, supra note 247, at 40 (quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein).
301. WAJNRYB, supra note 245, at 27-28 (relying on Erving Goffman).
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 36 2011-2012
Number 1] PROTECTING EMOTIVE SPEECH 37
because of the intensity it evokes.302 Indeed, today it is "known and used
more for its emotional meaning" than for its reference to lovemaking,
which is "largely ignored . . 0." Though it may have been used originally
because of its referential function, it has "gravitated over time toward more
emotional outlets," so that today, "[t]here is barely a sexual glimmer of
meaning in the word, as it often means something more like 'go figure.',,
304
The word is often uttered, read, and written for the thrill of the forbidden,
to insult or to express "the jangled state of one's nerves . . . .,,305 Law
Professor, Christopher Fairman, writes that the use of the word is related to
power. When someone experiences intense excitement, the person is likely
to choose a word that is powerful because of its taboo, rather than because
of its literal definition. 30 Fuck," he writes, "is all about sex and nothing
about sex all at the same time. Virtually none of the uses of the word that I
discuss have anything to do with sex." 30 7 As a result, "When the FCC
declares all uses offfuck are per se sexual and indecent, taboo triumphs over
reason."308
One cannot overlook the sexual connotation of the word, however.
Leo Stone notes that other references to lovemaking-to "sleep with," for
example, and even "to screw"-have definitions that are not related to
sexual intercourse.3b9 But he writes that the f-word "has no other primary
meaning; all other meanings are figurative or (at the present time)
consciously derivative."310 And, he notes, "[w]hen a man says: 'I got my
day all flicked up,' he is fully aware of the primary sexual meaning of the
word." 311
Therein lies the conundrum-the word is always sexual, even when it
is not, which may explain the inconsistent and schizophrenic way it is
treated in society and in the law.
VI. THE F-WORD--THE NEXT ROUND
The f-word is, in itself, a conundrum. As one observer noted, it
reflects "a uniquely high level of emotional intensity."312 Another wrote
302. Id. at 45-46.
303. Id. at 45.
304. Id. at 45-46.
305. Read, supra note 245, at 274.
306. FAIRMAN, supra note 261, at 8.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 9.
309. Stone, supra note 256, at 35-36.
310. Id. at 35.
311. Id.
312. FRALEIGH & TuMAN, supra note 136, at 156.
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that it behaves like "a kind of verbal 'assault . . . ."'313 Yet, despite the
protestations of Justice Scalia, it cannot be defined with sufficient precision
to settle the question of when it can be banned under the First
Amendment.314 And, as previously indicated, that is a question the Court is
likely to face when it decides FCC v. Fox Television Stations in the current
term.315
Clearly, words must be defined if they are to be banned, and the
problem with defining the f-word has been made clear earlier in this article.
The problem crystallizes, however, when one juxtaposes definitions of the
word with the facts of Cohen: Even if "fuck" can be defined, what does
"Fuck the Draft" mean? 316
It is unclear whether the semantic battle fought between Justices
Scalia and Stevens will be revived this term. Justice Stevens, of course, has
been replaced by Elena Kagan, and Justice Souter, who was also in dissent
in the case, has been replaced by Sonia Sotomayor. The First Amendment
inclinations of both Justices have yet to be determined. 317 If the debate is
revisited,318 a parallel question is whether the Court will reaffirm the
doctrine established in 1969 in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC and
vouchsafed in later cases that broadcast media are subject to less First
Amendment protection than other types of media?31 The issue was
broached by both the Second Circuit and Justice Thomas.321
313. Shaman, supra note 7, at 327.
314. It was a similar absence of precision that prompted Justice Brennan to change his
mind about the regulation of obscenity. Writing for the Court in Roth v. United States,
Justice Brennan held that obscenity could be restricted because it was "utterly without
redeeming social importance." 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Sixteen years later, however,
dissenting in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, he wrote that he was forced to conclude "that
the concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide
fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials . . . ." 413 U.S.
49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
315. See supra discussion accompanying notes 26-48.
316. See Arkes, supra note 167, at 315-16.
317. See infra notes 361-69 and accompanying discussion.
318. The focus here is on the use of the f-word, but the issues related to indecency raised
in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, 129 S. Ct. 2176
(2009), and ABC, Inc. v. FCC, No 08-0841-AG (2d Cir. June 20, 2008) are similar. See
supra notes 33-48 and accompanying discussion.
319. Indeed, as Justice Thomas pointed out, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct.
1800, 1820-22 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) was based on the proposition enunciated in
Red Lion.
320. Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 325-27 (2d Cir. 2010). See also
infra note 360 and accompanying discussion.
321. See infra notes 354-58 and accompanying discussion.
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VII. AN EMOTIVE SPEECH DOCTRINE?
One cannot help but agree with the simple logic of Leo Stone
whom-more than fifty years before Justice Scalia retorted that the f-word
is always sexual, and Justice Stevens maintained that it would be absurd to
interpret a frustrated golfer's expletive as sexual-wrote that the word
always has a sexual undercurrent even though its use is not always in a
sexual context322 (what the FCC calls a literal versus a nonliteral use).323
The conflict is not likely to be resolved.
One solution, however, might be the incorporation of Justice Harlan's
cogent observation that speech has two elements-the cognitive and the
emotive-and they deserve equal protection.324 The holding has been
largely ignored since it was enunciated in 1971, possibly because of the
difficulty a court might have in its implementation. Under an emotive
speech doctrine, courts would spend less time attempting to determine
whether words are or are not an "essential part of any exposition of
ideas,"325 and the Supreme Court might not be required to establish a test to
determine whether various types of expression constitute intimidating
speech.326 And, of course, judges and Justices would not be required to
hold debates on the definition of the f-word. On the other hand, courts
would be required to determine when speech is primarily cognitive, when it
is primarily emotive, and-possibly-when it is a mix of cognitive and
emotive, mirroring Chief Justice Earl Warren's delineation of the types of
conduct in United States v. O'Brien.327
The enunciation of the f-word is almost always emotive, at least based
on Cohen. Cohen's activity does not appear to be emotional-he simply
entered a courthouse where he was expected to be a witness. Yet Chief
Justice Burger referred to his action as an "emotionally unstable
outburst[]." 8 Cohen's speech was emotive only because of the presence
322. Stone, supra note 256, at 35, quoted at supra note 308.
323. See Pacifica Found., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2698, paras. 12-
13(1987).
324. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971), quoted at supra note 157.
325. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
326. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 357 (2003). See also W. Wat Hopkins, Cross
Burning Revisited: What the Supreme Court Should Have Done in Virginia v. Black and
Why it Didn't, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 269 (2004) (arguing that the Court
established a new type of speech-intimidating speech-that lies outside the protection of
the First Amendment, and that the Court will eventually be required to define the types of
speech that are "intimidating").
327. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (pointing out that not all conduct is expressive and that
some conduct has both speech and nonspeech elements).
328. Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger, supra note 139.
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of the single word, regardless of whether the word was used as a synonym
for the act of sexual intercourse or as an intensifier.
If such a passive use of the word constituted emotive speech, then
certainly Cher's dismissive "fuck 'em" to her critics and Bono's
exclamation that winning the Golden Globe Award was "fucking brilliant"
would constitute emotive speech and, therefore, would be eligible for
protection under what might be called the Cohen test. Similarly, the
exposure for a few seconds of a breast during a high-energy dance during
the halftime show of a Super Bowl would constitute emotive speech and
would be equally deserving of protection, at least outside the parameters of
the broadcast media.329
All of these expressions, one could argue, are targeted at evoking
emotional responses, though not necessarily physical responses. An
emotive speech doctrine would also impact such expressive conduct as the
Super Bowl example demonstrates. The Court has recognized the emotive
elements of flag burning330 and cross burning, 331 both of which would be
protected under the doctrine without examination of whether the speech
was political332 or possibly intimidating.333 Emotive speech, however,
would not be protected if it fell into one of the categories of speech that the
Court has determined to be unprotected. There would be times, therefore,
when a court would have to examine both the cognitive and emotive
elements of speech.
Of course, speech may be emotive and, at the same time, express
ideas, information, or opinions. As one scholar noted, despite Justice
Harlan's reference to "otherwise inexpressible emotions," 334 it would be
odd to think that emotions can never be "accurately expressed in a precise,
detached way."335 "Emotions," he wrote, are "not merely, sensations or
twinges, but typically involve beliefs, judgments, interpretations or
329. See CBS v. FCC, _ F.3d _ (3d Cir. 2011), 2011 WL 5176139; Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 322 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010).
330. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S 397, 408-09 (1989) (discussing the likelihood that
burning the U.S. flag might cause a disturbance because of the emotional response to the
act); id. at 422-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the symbolic nature of the flag).
331. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 357 (2003) (writing that cross burning is a
symbol of hate and that few messages are more powerful).
332. The Court clearly held that burning the flag was political speech. Johnson, 491 U.S.
at 406 ("The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and
overwhelmingly apparent."). Such a determination would not be necessary under a Cohen
test, however.
333. Black, 538 U.S. at 357. See also Hopkins, supra note 326.
334. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
335. R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 34 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 429, 431 (2003).
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 40 2011-2012
PROTECTING EMOTIVE SPEECH
reasonable evaluations of world features." 336 Therefore, expressions of
emotion "can encompass cognition in general, intentions, beliefs,
judgments, attitudes, modes of perceivinS and understanding, and even
what we might call world-constructions." Indeed, even Cohen's classic
emotive speech was presumed to convey ideas-it was part of the political
debate of the day on the Vietnam War, and one scholar emphasized that
it was within the political mainstream. 339
The language used by Walter Chaplinsky is also an example of a mix
of cognitive and emotive speech. While a modem analysis might find the
epithets "God-damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist" to be emotive,
clearly the Court focused on the cognitive elements of the speech-
otherwise there would be no need to measure whether the speech was an
"essential part of any exposition of ideas ... ."340 The Chaplinsky Court
was, indeed, in error to think that designated classes of unprotected speech
were "well-defined and narrowly limited." 341 As one observer noted, the
lewd, obscene, and profane "have proven remarkably resistant to precise
definition."342
Definitions would be unnecessary under Justice Harlan's proposal,
and that, in itself, would be a boon to free expression. Can it ever be good
when a Court rules that the innocuous phrase "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"
advocates illegal drug use,343 and that there is no way to use the word
"fuck" that is not sexual? As legal scholar Ronald Krotoszynski wrote,
"Ultimately,4the ability to define language becomes the ability to control
thoughts." The question would rest on whether the speech is emotive.
Today, such a test would not apply to the facts of Fox Television Stations,
however, at least not under current law.
336. Id. at 459.
337. Id. at 460.
338. See William S. Cohen, supra note 163, at 1610 (noting that Robert Paul Cohen used
profanity to make a point); Shaman, supra note 7, at 344 (Is Cohen's speech political or
profanity? "Obviously it is both.").
339. See Farber, supra note 133, at 295.
340. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 568, 572 (1942). See also Arkes,
supra note 167, at 317; FRALEIGH & TUMAN, supra note 136, at 156.
341. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571.
342. Shaman, supra note 7, at 302.
343. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 402 (2007). See also supra note 11.
344. Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 1253.
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VIII. BROADCAST MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
One could argue that Cohen eliminated the notion that people have a
right to be protected from verbal assault in public places.345 Even if that is
true, broadcasting, for purposes of indecency law, does not constitute a
typical "public place"; it is treated differently from other media. Indecent
speech is allowed in the print media,346 over the telephone,347 in movies,348
over cable television systems, 349 and on the Internet.350 Such speech is not
allowed over the airwaves, even if the focus is on the emotive quality of the
speech. The prohibition, made clear in Pacifica351 and reiterated in Fox
Television Stations,352 was based on the proposition that broadcasting is a
unique medium because of its pervasiveness and, in particular, its unique
accessibility to children, a proposition first enunciated in Red Lion.353
In his Fox Television Stations concurrence, Justice Thomas spent all
but one sentence attacking those rationales and the general proposition that
First Amendment protection for the broadcast media is not equivalent to
that of the print media. He wrote, "Red Lion and Pacifica were
unconvincing when they were issued, and the passage of time has only
increased doubt regarding their continued validity." 354
First, Justice Thomas wrote, Red Lion adopted and Pacifica
reaffirmed "a legal rule that lacks any textual basis in the Constitution." 355
Second, even if the rules upon which the reduced protection is based could
have been justified when the two decisions were delivered, "dramatic
technological advances have eviscerated the factual assumptions
345. See, e.g., Arkes, supra note 167, at 313.
346. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that, even though
indecent material may be sold to adults, it can be restricted in its sale to minors).
347. See Sable Comms., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (striking down restrictions on
indecent pay phone messages while upholding restrictions on obscene pay phone messages).
348. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning
ordinances for adult movie houses, even though, the sexually explicit material being shown
in those movie houses is protected by the First Amendment).
349. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)
(holding that regulations requiring cable systems to segregate and block indecent
programming were unconstitutional).
350. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding unconstitutional those portions of
the Communication Decency Act that criminalized the posting of indecent material on the
Internet).
351. 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
352. 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1806 (2009) (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49).
353. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (noting that the
Government may restrain public broadcasting "because of the scarcity of radio
frequencies").
354. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1820 (Thomas, J., concurring).
355. Id. at 1821.
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underlying those decisions." 356 There is no longer any scarcity, he wrote,
and the broadcast media are no longer uniquely pervasive.357 These
changes require a departure from precedent under the prevailing approach
to stare decisis.3 58
No other Justice joined Thomas' critique, but Justice Stevens at least
acknowledged that Justice Thomas was not far afield: "While Justice
Thomas and I disagree about the continued wisdom of Pacifica, the
changes in technology and the availability of broadcast spectrum he
identifies certainly counsel a restrained approach to indecency regulation,
not the wildly expansive path the FCC has chosen."3 59
The Second Circuit adopted the same position in the same case,
finding that "it is increasingly difficult to describe the broadcast media as
uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to children, and at some point
in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply in the context of regulating
broadcast television."360
While Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in holding that the FCC
did not violate the APA, it is conceivable that Justice Thomas could also
vote that a ban on all expletives-even fleeting expletives-on the
airwaves is unconstitutional because the rationale behind that ban is flawed.
If there is no constitutional justification for treating the broadcast media
differently, there is no constitutional justification for banning speech that
would not be banned if expressed via other media.
Justice Thomas, therefore, could forge an alignment with the
dissenters in Fox Television Stations: Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Two
other dissenters, Justices Souter and Stevens, will not be on the Court to
hear such a case. Justice Souter has been replaced by Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, and Justice Stevens by Justice Elena Kagan. One can only
guess at how the new Justices would vote, but there are reasons to believe
they might be in alignment with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
First Amendment scholar, Ronald K.L. Collins, wrote before the
confirmation of Justice Sotomayor that there were reasons for cautious
optimism in the area of free speech jurisprudence,361 and the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, though it wrote that "no clear
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1822.
3 5 8. Id.
359. Id. at 1828 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted and capitalization
modified).
360. Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 489 F.3d. 444, 465 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd on other
grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). See also supra note 320 and accompanying discussion.
361. Ronald K.L. Collins, Sotomayor and Free Expression, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR.
(May 28, 2009), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.com/commentary.aspx?id=21637.
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standard on First Amendment issues has emerged from her many cases,"
also found that she seemed to support the rights of the public and press to
access to court proceedings and 3"[to] be free from judicial and
prosecutorial restraints on speech." Her decisions show "a careful
analysis of the First Amendment issues at stake," the lobbying group
wrote.36 3
In addition, during her first term, Justice Sotomayor voted with
Justice Breyer in at least two speech-related cases,364 and during oral
arguments in a third case, seemed to question the speech restrictions related
to alleged terrorist organizations. 365
Justice Kagan seemed even more First Amendment friendly before
her appointment. 66 Adam Liptak of the New York Times writes that she is
more conservative than Justice Stevens, but also suggests that she would
not have voted with Stevens in either FCC v. Pacifica, in which Stevens
wrote the Opinion of the Court, or Texas v. Johnson, in which he wrote a
dissent.367 Justice Kagan has written that the government may not limit
speech because citizens find the ideas offered wrong or offensive, which
would have put her at odds with the Pacifica decision, and she has
specifically stated that the Court was right in its Texas v. Johnson
decision. In addition, First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh suggests
that Kagan's attitudes toward the First Amendment are much like Justice
Ginsburg's. 369
362. A Summary of Media-Related Decisions by Supreme Court Nominee Sonia
Sotomayor, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (May 27, 2009),
http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/20090527-asummaryofinediarelateddecisionsbysup
remecourtnomin.pdf.
363. Id.
364. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Graham Cnty. Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1411 (2010)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
365. See Tony Mauro, Justices Skeptical of Anti-Terror Speech Rules, FIRST
AMENDMENT CTR. (June 9, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/justices-skeptical-
of-anti-terror-speech-rules. Unexpectedly, in this case, Justice Sotomayor was seemingly at
odds with future Justice Kagan who, as Solicitor General, was arguing the case for the
United States.
366. See A Summary of the Media-Law Background of Supreme Court Nominee Elena
Kagan, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (May 13, 2010),
http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/20100513-asummaryofthemedialawbackgroundofsup
remecourtnomin.pdf.
367. Adam Liptak, On Speech, Kagan Leaned Toward Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/us/politics/16court.html.
368. Id.
369. Eugene Volokh, Elena Kagan as Scholar, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 10,
2010, 3:47 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/05/10/elena-kagan-as-scholar/.
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There is a possibility, therefore, that Justice Thomas might join
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer-the dissenters in Fox Television Stations-
in striking down a ban on all uses of the f-word on the airwaves. That
would leave only Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Alito from the original majority, with Justice Kagan controlling the
outcome of the case. Justice Sotomayor, who was on the Second Circuit
when the case was heard, has recused herself from consideration of the
case, also leaving the possibility of a 4-4 tie.370
A new majority, therefore, could render a judgment, if not an Opinion
of the Court, favoring Fox on grounds that the FCC is interpreting
indecency too narrowly under the First Amendment, that is, that a ban on
any specific word in any context or a glimpse of nudity-no matter how
brief-is unconstitutional. Such a holding would be a major step for
increased freedom of expression over the airwaves.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is always room for hope in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. Just as Justice Brennan expressed hope that the
decision in Cohen would be harmless,371 we can maintain hope that the
Court recognizes the inherent benefits of abandoning efforts to define
words for the public, and then restrict those words based on narrow judicial
definitions.
We can also hope that the Supreme Court will adopt Justice Harlan's
proposition that emotive elements of speech be protected equally with the
cognitive elements. Granting obtrusive protection for emotive expression
would make decision making in free speech jurisprudence simpler and
sturdier. The rule would apply to speech uttered on the airwaves as well as
through other media.
Such a holding might be considered radical at this point in the debate
over offensive language, however, so, in the alternative, we can hope that a
coalition of Justices would strike down efforts to ban so-called fleeting
expletives on the airwaves by recognizing the futility and absurdity of such
efforts. Such a holding is more likely considering the position of Justice
Thomas and the possible positions of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.
We can hope, therefore, that the silliness of Fox Television Stations
will be short lived.
370. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 613 F.3d 317 (2d. Cir. 2011), cert. granted 79
U.S.L.W. 3629 (U.S. Jun. 27, 2011) (No. 10-1293).
371. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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